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10.1 Introduction
The United Nation’s Framework Convention for Climate Change is inherently
built on the precautionary principle, arguing for action before the science is
fully understood. The convention states that "the lack of full scientiﬁc cer-
tainty should not be used as an excuse to postpone action." A swift reduction
of emissions is supported by numerous environmental groups to prevent possi-
ble severe consequences of climate change, while expectedly business groups
are arguing for a more cautious approach. In arguing against the Kyoto
protocols, the Bush government’s position is that "robust scientiﬁcr e s e a r c h
is needed to better understand the climate issue." Bush government oﬃcials
have gone as far as to argue "there is no such thing as the precautionary princi-
ple." (OMB quote John Graham, OMB, in a speech to the Heritage Foundation
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/speeches/031020graham.html).
Opponents of emissions reductions stress the need for ﬂexibility. U.S. Pres-
ident Bush himself has argued that there is a cost to imposing regulations to re-
duce greenhouse gases (GHGs) now before more is known about climate change
(Oﬃce of the President, 2001). This statement has been echoed by industry:
"Climate change presents a long-term, uncertain, serious global risk...Addressing
climate change requires balancing long-term uncertain risks against society’s es-
sential and growing demand for energy" (Exxon Mobil). Exxon and others have
argued that strict emissions caps and regulation will limit economic growth and
therefore the ability to respond more appropriately in the future (International
Chamber of Commerce). Ironically, some of these groups have also helped fund
research to argue that there is no scientiﬁc consensus on global climate change
(e.g. Exxon Mobil, Environmental Defence Fund, 2005) while arguing that sci-
ence can and will provide answers to climate change in the future. This paper
asks whether it makes sense to act now before the eﬀe c t so fc l i m a t ec h a n g ea r e
known or wait until we have more information about possible damage? Is there
an economic model that would explain these two disparate positions?
The one area of consensus is that there is uncertainty about the nature and
degree of damage threatened by climate change. "Because there is considerable
uncertainty in current understanding of how the climate system varies naturally
and reacts to emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols, current estimates of
the magnitude of future warming should be regarded as tentative and subject
to future adjustments (either upward or downward),” (U.S. National Academy
of Sciences, 2001, p.1). "The latest IPCC assessment is that doubling CO2
levels will warm the world by anything from 1.4 to 5.8◦C. In other words, this
predicts a rise in global temperature from pre-industrial levels of around 14.8
◦C to between 16.2 and 20.6◦C. Even at the low end, this is probably the
biggest ﬂuctuation in temperature that has occurred in the history of human
civilization. But uncertainties within the IPCC models remain, and the skeptics
charge that they are so great that this conclusion is not worth the paper it is
written on... Sceptics who pounce on such great uncertainties should remember,
however, that they cut both ways. Indeed, new research based on thousands
of diﬀerent climate simulation models run using spare computing capacity of
2idling PCs suggest that doubling CO2 levels could increase by as much as 11◦C
(Nature, vol 434, p. 403)," (New Scientist 2005).
The question remains as to what degree that uncertainty will be resolved
before the eﬀects of climate change are felt. Decision-makers not only do not
know the full eﬀect of climate change now, they may be unlikely to receive full
information in the foreseeable future. In this paper, we explore the eﬀect of the
quality of information on early investment. Speciﬁcally, we ask how the schedule
and among of mitigation varies with the quality of the forthcoming information.
Unlike much of the past literature on decision-making under uncertainty, we do
not rely on irreversibility, and instead rely on smoothing. This approach allows
us to add on an option value if desired, but we do not need it to get interesting
results. The paper proceeds as follows in the next section we discuss the past
literature on decision-making under uncertainty as it pertains to climate change.
In section 3 we develop the model and ﬁrst order conditions. In section 4, we
present a graphical illustration of our results, and we end with conclusions.
0.2 Background
Those arguing to allow the economy ’ﬂexibility’ to take advantage of future in-
formation are eﬀectively making an option-value argument: there is a sunk cost
associated with acting today, and we will know more tomorrow, so there is a
value to waiting. However, there is also a potential cost to waiting: increasing
environmental damage, such as the melting of polar ice caps, which may be
irreversible. Environmental goods that face permanent damage can be thought
of as having an environmental option value (called a quasi-option value). The
concept of a “quasi” option value was developed in 1974 by Arrow and Fisher
who noted that if there was a degree of irreversibility to an environmental ac-
tion, and more information is expected in the next period, for example updated
information regarding the costs of the environmental action, then there is an
added beneﬁt to preserving the environment in the short run.
Applying the concept of (regular) option value to non-market goods, Zhao
and Kling (2000, 2001) develop a number of predictions about how willingness
to pay (WTP) for an environmental externality will vary with information and
reversibility: (1) WTP will increase if individuals expect that less information
can be gathered about a good in the future. Thus, if expected information
about climate change was likely to improve, individuals will be willing to spend
less today to counteract the eﬀects of global warming. (2) WTP will increase if
individuals expect that the investment is more easily reversible. Therefore, poli-
cies that decrease the emission of GHGs that involve fundamental (irreversible)
restructuring of the economy will be less acceptable than those that involve in-
vestments that are not sunk. For example, the population may be less willing to
accept the phasing out of gasoline driven cars than an increased tax on gasoline
and they may be more willing to invest in soil carbon sinks (which are inher-
ently a short-term solution) to investing in alternative fuel research, where the
costs are sunk. (3) WTP will increase if individuals are more certain about a
3good’s value. In other words, the more certain the beneﬁts of the policy action,
the more individuals are willing to support it. (4) WTP for a good today will
increase with an increasing discount rate. In our case, since the object of inter-
est is an investment which involves foregoing income today, the willingness to
support a policy that will reduce the current economy will decrease the higher
the individual’s discount rate.
Although Zhao and Kling do not consider the idea that there is also a quasi-
option value that will increase the value of policy action today, some intuition
can be gained from applying their results can also to the quasi-option value. As-
sume for the moment that all investment in mitigation can be recouped, however
(some portion of) environmental damage from climate change is irreversible. In
this case, one might conclude (1) support for policy action will decrease if one
expects less information about the costs of climate change in the future. To
understand the intuition behind this result, consider that the value of ﬂexibility
increases with expected information, and mitigation today increases ﬂexibility.
(2) Presumably, support for mitigation will increase with the irreversibility of
climate change. (3) The more certain the costs of climate change, the less wiling
the public will be to invest to reduce it today. The intuition here is similar to
that used in point (1) — the greater the certainty, the lower the value of ﬂexibil-
ity. The last point remains unchanged — a higher discount rate will still decrease
expenditure today.
But what if one has both option value and quasi-option value at once? Kol-
stad (1996a) compares conﬂicting option values exploring the eﬀect of a sunk
investment versus stock externalities, where the stock externalities act as the
sunk costs of not abating now. How does the prospect of better second-period
information about the consequences of the externality aﬀect the desired level
of ﬁrst-period investment in abatement capital? Kolstad allows the rate of
learning to vary while the degree of investment irreversibility and the decay
rate of GHGs are ﬁxed. He ﬁnds which eﬀect dominates depends on the rela-
tive magnitudes of the decay and depreciation rates and on expectations about
damages. Using a multi-period simulation of GHGs based on the DICE model
(Nordhaus 1994), Kolstad (1996b) ﬁnds that the optimal level of investment is
aﬀected by the capital stock irreversibility while emissions irreversibility has no
impact. In his parameterization, the non-negativity restriction on emissions
is never binding. Too little investment in emission control in the early periods
can be compensated by a bit more investment in later periods, but there is no
scenario in which it would be optimal to emit negatively in the future to correct
over-emission today.
Ulph and Ulph (1997) also explore climate change and irreversibility. They
develop a two period model and show that a suﬃcient condition for ﬁrst-period
emissions with learning to be less than ﬁrst-period emissions without learning
is that the non-negative restriction on emissions be binding in the no-learning
case. In other words, for the government to cut its emissions today, there has
to be some restriction that does not allow the decision-maker to push too much
of its mitigation eﬀorts into the second period, and that restriction must be
binding. Using a similar framework, Fisher and Narain (2003) assume that the
4decision-maker will learn whether a climate event has occurred, and whether the
damage associated with that event is high or low, where the risk is a function of
the stock of GHGs. Again, they model the “sunk” aspect of the climate change
by assuming a non-negativity constraint on emissions. They then consider how
the level of ﬁrst-period investment in abatement varies with the irreversibility
of the investment, and with the degradability of the stock of GHGs. As one
would intuit, the more sunk the investment, the lower the investment in the
ﬁrst period. The higher the irreversibility of GHGs, the higher the investment
in the ﬁrst period. Quantitatively, they ﬁnd the eﬀect of capital irreversibility is
much stronger than either the eﬀect of emissions irreversibility or of endogenous
risk.
Our contribution is developing a model that does not use option value to
explore the eﬀects of uncertainty on climate mitigation, and instead relies on
smoothing, which we argue is less restrictive. Further, unlike other models,
we consider the revelation of the quality of information to come, not just the
information itself. The model can then easily compare the incentives for
smoothing potential costs of damage and the costs of mitigation.
0.3 Model
As noted above, recent predictions of temperature increases due to climate
change range from 2 to 11 ◦C (Nature). Given that some degree of climate
change is generally accepted, we make the assumption that even a good out-
come implies some damage. Consider a temperature increase of 2 ◦Ct oi m p l ya
"good" outcome and 11 ◦C to represent a "bad" outcome. The government can
respond to this threat by investing in mitigation, such as altering their economy
to emit fewer GHGs. Altering the economy is assumed to be expensive, for
example, setting up system of hydrogen fuel stations is costly. The more the
economy is altered in a single period, the higher the immediate costs.
Assume that in period 0 a country can invest in damage mitigation, m0.I n
period 1, a country receives information about the degree of the damage, and
can invest again in mitigation, m1. In period 2, the country experiences the
damage. Damage is the function of a stochastic variable K and the amount
spent on mitigation D = D(K − m0 + m1), where damage is either minor i.e.
"good" (G), or "bad" (B), where B>G .
Traditional option value requires irreversibility. In terms of irreversibility of
mitigation, there would have to be a situation where one would want negative
mitigation in the second period. For example, if damage in the good state is
zero, D|G =0and the damage function can never be negative, i.e. D ≥ 0,i f
mitigation in the initial period is positive (and cost of mitigation is positive),
the government would like to reverse that mitigation in the following period,
i.e. m1 < 0. One simple way of modeling option value is to constrain mitigation
in period 1 to be non-negative, i.e. m1 ≥ 0. On the other hand, quasi option
value can be modeled as limits on the quantity of mitigation in any one period.
5If climate change results in irreversible damage, that can be thought of as there
being no level of mitigation that can address that damage, i.e. m ≤ X. However,
we ﬁnd that we can achieve similar results without the use of option value,
although it could easily be added in.
If both restrictions are in place, the results are ambiguous, and become a
question that will be given by assumptions of the model (such as in Kolstad
1996b) or empirics. Given that our basic assumption is that damage will be
greater than zero, we do not need to place restrictions on the level of mitigation.
For example, one the infrastructure for hydrogen vehicles is created, we assume
that the government will not regret making that investment. Similarly, we do
not need to limit on the amount of mitigation in any one period. The amount
of mitigation the government may desire to undertake in any one period may
be very expensive, but we assume if the government will exists, the government
could mitigate that much.
Instead of these assumptions of set limits, we assume that there are incentives
for smoothing. By imposing curvature on the damage and mitigation cost
functions, the government has an incentive to mitigate the same amount in
both periods, and to limit the spread between the damage in both possible
states. Thus, we assume that both costs and damages are increasing at an
increasing rate. Thus, we assume
(1) C0,C00 > 0,a n dC000 ≥ 0.
(2) D0,D00 > 0 and D000 ≥ 0.
Instead of assuming that a decision-maker will know the truth in the next
period, this model takes into account the quality of anticipated information.
Assume a government wants to decide how much to invest in GHG mitigation
today, but expects some information as to the eﬀect of climate change tomor-
row. In period 0, a country has to choose the amount of investment in GHG
mitigation, m0 with no information about whether the damage it will face will
be good or bad. However, it knows in the following period it will receive some
information about the future damage, but that information will be of a certain
quality, denoted as α, ranging from no information (α = 1
4) to full information
(at α =0 ). Thus α can be thought of as a parameter of ambiguity. Regardless
of the quality of information, the true probability of receiving a good or bad
outcome is 1
2. We ask how the mitigation schedule and total mitigation changes
with the quality of information.
Assume that the more favorable, or ’high’ the information, the better the
probability of a good outcome. Speciﬁcally, with full information, if one ob-
serves ’high’ information, the probability of experiencing a good outcome is one.
On the other hand, if there is no information, there is an equal probability of
experiencing a good and a bad outcome regardless of whether the information
observed is high or low. Assume the following probabilities are associated with
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4, α = 1
4 implies there is no information, α =0implies there
is full information
Assuming the government chooses m0 b a s e do ni t se x p e c t e dm i t i g a t i o ni n
period 1, we can solve the two period choices simultaneously (note that we
assume that the government is risk-neutral). Thus, the government chooses
m i t i g a t i o ni np e r i o d0 ,m0, and the mitigation conditional on the information
in period 1, be it high (mH
1 )o rl o w ,(mL
1) to minimize expected welfare loss.
Welfare loss can come both from the damage,D(m) and the cost of mitigation
C(m).Further, assume that mitigation tomorrow may not be as useful as miti-
gation today - speciﬁcally think of the government reducing the ﬂow of GHGs,
so that mitigation tomorrow implies the stock of GHGs has increased by the
additional emissions in period 0. This stock eﬀect is represented by δ, where
0 <δ≤ 1. Also assume that the government has a discount factor, β,w h e r e
0 <β≤ 1 The government’s objective function is then to chose its levels of
mitigation to minimize the welfare loss, i.e. the damage times the probability


























































































To determine how the government’s choice of mitigation schedule changes
with the quality of information, we totally diﬀerentiate w.r.t. the three endoge-
nous variables, m0,m H
1 ,m L














































































































































































L are the weighted average of the change in the marginal
damage function when the information is high and low respectively. Thus, A00
H
is the change in the expected marginal damage caused by increase in mitigation,
when information is high. Similarly, NH and NL are the diﬀerence in the mar-
ginal damage during the bad and good state when the information is high and
low respectively. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the marginal damage associated with
various levels of outcome and mitigation. The weighted average of the change
in marginal damage, A00
H and A00
L and the change in marginal damage NH and
NL are illustrated at full and no information. Since initially the government
does not know whether the information indicates a good or bad outcome, m0 is
constant given the quality of information. At full information, A00
L is the slope
of the marginal damage function at B − m0 − mL
1 since the government knows
for certain that the damage will be bad, and mitigates appropriately. Likewise,
if the information is high, the government knows the damage will be good, and
will mitigate less in the ﬁrst period. Thus, A00
H is the slope of the marginal
damage function at G − m0 − mH
1 .N H is simply the diﬀerence in marginal
damage at a bad and good outcome when the government chooses its mitiga-
tion given high information and therefore expecting to see a good outcome, and
8NL is the diﬀerence in marginal damage between good and bad states when the
government mitigates expecting to see a bad outcome. Note that, as long as
there is some information, NH >N L, thus the diﬀerence in marginal damage
between a good and bad outcome is larger with high information than with
low information. Since, on average, the government will mitigate less with
a revelation of high information, and mitigation matters more the greater the
damage, an unexpected bad outcome will be much worse than a relatively ex-
pected one, while the damage of an unexpected good outcome will only be a bit
better than if the government had planned based on the expectation of a good
outcome. The other thing to note is that if marginal damage is increasing at an
increasing rate (i.e. D000 > 0) and there is some information, the slope of the
marginal damage function will be higher with low information than with high
information, thus A00
L >A 00
H. The intuition goes as follows: as the information
is low, the probability of a bad outcome is higher than the probability of a
good outcome. As long as mitigation is not costless, the government will not
increase their mitigation to completely oﬀset the increased probability of a bad
outcome, implying that the expected outcome with low information, even given
the increased mitigation, will still be worse than if the information indicates
that a good outcome is more likely.
As information quality deteriorates, the choice of mitigation in period one
with high information will converge to that with low information, until, when
the information is content-free, the two levels of mitigation will be the same.
This schenario is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. As the levels of mitigation converge, so
do the diﬀerence in marginal damages and the slopes of marginal damage: NH
= NL, and A00
H = A00
L.
Proposition 1 Mitigation in the ﬁrst period will increase with better informa-
tion (dm0
dα < 0) iﬀ t h er a t i oo ft h ea b s o l u t ev a l u eo ft h ee l a s t i c i t yo fm a r g i n a l
beneﬁt to marginal cost is higher with high information than with low informa-
tion.
Using Cramer’s rule, we can now calculate how the ﬁrst period mitigation
















































H are all positive (given our assumptions on D(·)











H > 0. Thus the sign of dm0
dα depends on the sign























































Figure 3: Marginal damage and mitigation with no information
11diﬀerence in marginal damage in the two states with high and low information.
If D000 > 0, the diﬀerence in marginal damage will be greater with high infor-
mation than low, implying the ﬁrst term will be larger than 1. Likewise, if
D000 > 0, the the expected marginal damage is greater if the information is low
than when it is high, thus AL” >A H”. If C000 =0 , C00
H = C00
L, and AL” >A H”
the second term is clearly less than one, implying that the mitigation in period
0 decreases with an increase in information quality, dm0
dα > 0.If C000 ≤ 0,t h e
sign is unambiguously positive. However, if C000 > 0,C L” >C H” which may
oﬀset the diﬀerence in AL” and AH”. For the derivative to be negative how-
ever, the relative increase in marginal costs must be greater than the relative
expected marginal damage, implying C000 >D 000. Thus, the curvature of the
cost function must be positive and greater than the curvature of the damage
function. In short, if the ratio of the change in marginal damage to marginal
cost is much higher in the bad state than in the good state, the term may be
negative, implying that a decrease in information (thus, moving to less than
perfect information) will result in less mitigation initially. This can be thought
of the marginal cost of mitigation in the bad state increasing much more over the
good state compared to the marginal damage. One could envision this happen-
ing if, with information that the damage is likely bad, the mitigation needed in
the ﬁrst period is unacceptably high. For example, imagine a scenario where a
small increase in expected damage implied that all inhabitants of coastal regions
have to be evacuated, and coastal cities need to be rebuilt inland.












> 1. For this
ratio to be greater than one, the ratio in the slopes of the expected marginal



























H can be rewritten as
ηH
εH where ηH is the elasticity of marginal
beneﬁta n dεH is the elasticity of marginal cost.
To see this result graphically, consider ﬁgure 4, where the choice of mitigation
is illustrated under the two extremes - a situation with full information compared
to that with no information. For simplicity, we assume that marginal cost is
linear, and there is no stock eﬀect or discount rate. Because of the incentive for
smoothing, the government will want to equate expected marginal beneﬁt( e q u a l
to negative expected marginal damage) and expected marginal cost across the
two periods. With no information, the expected marginal damage in the second
period will be mid-way between the marginal damage with a bad outcome and






2D0(B − m0 −
m1)+1
2D0(G − m0 − m1). Since in this case the government receives no new
information in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d( a n dt h e r ei sn os t o c ke ﬀect or discount rate),
it will set mitigation equal across the two periods, m0 = m1. Thus, marginal



























H, α=0 ) 
E(-D’|m0
L, α=0) 
Figure 4: Mitigation choice in two periods with no and full information
the outcome will be good or bad with certainty, and can mitigate accordingly.
If the information is low, indicating a bad outcome, the government will in-
vest to the point where the marginal cost of mitigation equals the marginal
damage of the bad outcome. Thus, it will set ml
1 where D0(B − m0 − ml
1)=
C0(ml
1|m0). Similarly, with high information indicating a good outcome, is will
set mh
1,w h e r eD0(G−m0 −mh
1)=C0(mh
1|m0). In period 0, the expected mar-
ginal damage will be half-way between these two outcomes, E (D0|m0,α =0 )=
1
2D0(B − m0 − ml
1)+1
2D0(G − m0 − mh
1). The government will chose m0 so
that E (D0|m0,α =0 )=C0(m0) and will set C0(m0)=E(C0(m1)). Note that
in this situation, where C000 <D 000, there is more mitigation in the initial period
with no information than with full information.
In summary, dm0
dα is most likely to be positive, implying that as information
increases, one mitigates less in the ﬁrst period. For the reverse to be true,
i.e. dm0
dα < 0, C000 must be large relative to D000 and δ must be relatively large.
In other words, the curvature of the cost function must be greater than the


















H, α=0 ) 
E(-D’|m0
L, α=0) 
Figure 5: Mitigation choice in two periods with linear marginal damage and
convex marginal cost.
14general, as α is closer to 0 (i.e. there is closer to perfect information), dm0
dα is
more likely to be positive.
Proposition 2 Proposition 2: The total mitigation will not decrease with a
decrease in the quality of information.
The proof of this proposition is in the appendix.
0.4 Conclusions
In this paper we ask about the eﬀect of the quality of information on mitigation.
We ﬁnd that mitigation in the ﬁrst period tends to increase when there is less
information anticipated in the following period. This result is consistent with
Zhao and Kling (2000). Since the government has the incentive to try to
balance its expected expenditure over the two periods, and it can react more
precisely with better information, the expected expenditure will be lower will
better information. Therefore, its expenditure in the initial period will also
be lower if the information is expected to be of good quality. Further, overall
expenditure on mitigation will be lower with better information.
In summary, there is justiﬁcation for both those who argue that we need to
do more now (assuming that the information will not get better soon) and for
those who anticipate better information around the corner and argue to wait.
On the other hand, the model contradicts those corporations who both argue
that there should be little investment in mitigation now by arguing that the
science is too uncertain.
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0.6 Appendix: Proof of proposition 2.
T os o l v ef o rt h ee ﬀect of the quality of information on total mitigation, we















































































































































































































































































































































L) < 0 while all other terms are unam-









4δ and, assuming D000 ≥ 0 and









dα ≥ 0. Note










dα ≥ 0.Further, note that, unlike dm0
dα , if D000 =0and C000 > 0,t h et e r m
is still positive.
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